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ABSTRACT
We attempt to make inferences about the elasticity of the govern-
ment's demand for specific weapons by analyzing the statistical relation-
ship between quantity and cost revisions across the population of major
weapon systems, using data contained in the Pentagon's Selected Acquisi-
tion Reports.The cost revisions are due in part to the arrival of
technological information generated in the course of research and devel-
opment.When we standardize the data by program base year, we find that
the elasticity of demand is .55, and is significantly different from both
zero and unity.Thus, the governments demand for specific weapons is
inelastic, but not perfectly inelastic.The estimates also imply that
weapons acquisition is characterized by increasing returns: the wean and
median values of the elasticity of total cost with respect to quantity
are .78 and .72, respectively.
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BITNET: FAFLIGHT@GUGSBVMThe weapons acquisition process has long been recognized to be
characterized by considerable uncertainty.A 'major thesis" of Peck and
Scherer's (1962) seminal monograph on defense procurement was thatthere
is uniqueness in both the magnitude and the diverse sources of uncer-
tainty in weapons acquisition" (p.17).They defined two broad classes
of uncertainties: internal and external.
Internal (or technological) uncertainties relate to the possible
incidence of unforeseen technical difficulties in the development of
a specific weapon system.External uncertainties relate to factors
external to an individual project and yet affecting the course and
outcome of the project (p. 24).
The extent of internal (and possibly also of external) uncertainty about
a weapon system is greatest at the beginning of its "lifecycle.'As
resources are devoted to the system's research and development (R&D),
information about the true cost of acquiring the system is generated, and
the degree of technological uncertainty is reduced.
The question analyzed in this paper is, how do defense decision
makers --thepeople in the Pentagon and Congress who make decisions
about the allocation of defense resources --respondto the arrival of
new information concerning the cost of weapons acquisition?Because in
most economic settings it is inefficient not to change behavior in
response to new information, this question relates to the degree of
efficiency of defense procurement, an issue of considerable concern to
policy makers and the public.1
'Ina recent paper, Rogerson (1988b) provides a theoretical model
which accounts for the stylized fact that the equilibrium "quality," orMore specifically, we seek to determine the elasticity of the
governments demand for individual weapon systems.When the government's
estimate of the cost of acquiring a given weapon changes as a consequence
of data generated in the course of R&D, how much (if at all) does the
desired "buy" (quantity) change?An important determinant of the elas-
ticity of demand for a specific weapon is the degree of substitutability
between it and other weapons actually or potentially being acquired.
Scherer (1964, pp. 51-53) suggests that even systems that have no obvious
technical or operational substitutes are "threatened" by rival systems in
the bureaucratic competition for budgetary support.In the early 1960s,
for example, (offensive) Polaris missiles and the Nike Zeus ballistic
missile defense programs were regarded by top Defense Department (DOD)
officials as substitutes, in effect.
Early in a program's life—cycle, there is often intense competition
among a few potential suppliers to develop and produce the weapon.But
once the design and technical competition is over, the system is likely
to be produced on a sole-source basis.The winning contractor then
enjoys a monopoly with respect to the supply of the system.The extent
of the contractor's market power, and his ability to earn monopoly
profits, are inversely related to the elasticity of the government's
demand,The higher the demand elasticity, the lower the price the
contractor will seek to set and the lower hisprofit.2It may also be
extent of technical sophistication, of weapon systems tends to be
inefficiently high.
2Elastic demand is not the only feature of the environment that
might reduce monopoly profits.As Rogerson (1988a) has argued, such
profits tend to be dissipated through contract- or "rent-seeking" expen-
ditures on R&D during the design competition.Lichtenberg (1988a)3
the case that the higher the demand elasticity, the lower the optimal
level of government expenditure to monitor and regulate the costs and
profits of defense contractors.
Our research strategy for determining the demand elasticity is to
examine empirically the relationship between revisions in cost estimates
and revisions in quantity estimates across the population of major weapon
systems.The revisions are from original orbaseline" estimates (made
around the start of full-scale development) to "currentestimates (made
at a subsequent date).
A number of previous investigators have presented and analyzed data
on weapon system cost 'variance factors,'t defined as the ratio of actual
(ex post) system cost to the baseline (ex ante) estimate.Peck and
Scherer (1962, p. 22) found that the mean cost variance factor in a
sample of 11 programs was 3.2; only one program had a factor less than 2.
These findings were consistent with earlier results obtained by Marshall
and Heckling (1962).But Rich and Dews (1986, p.12) found that
'acquisition programs of the 1970s and 1980s experienced less percentage
cost growth than acquisition programs of the 1960s"; they also found that
nondefense programs (except for highway and water projects, generally
characterized by only modest technical risk) "experienced greater cost
growth than the defense programs, in some cases much greater't (p. 10).
Some limited attempts have been made to explain differences across
provides evidence that firms incur considerable unreimbursed R&D costs in
connection with these competitions.
3Tirole (1986) developsa theoretical model of contract negotiations
which provides a "justification" for equilibrium cost overruns.systems in cost variance factors in terms of the magnitude of the techni-
cal advance sought.
Previous authors have also, in some cases, provided distributions of
time and performance variance factors; these are, respectively, the ratio
of ex post to ex ante development time (in years) and system performance
(e.g., aircraft speed).But we are not aware of any previous analysis of
variances, or of attempts to relate these to cost variances in
order to make inferences about the elasticity of demand.
En the next section we present a simple model of revisions in
weapons system quantity and cost estimates.The following section
describes how the data contained in the Defense Departments Selected
Acquisition Reports can be used to estimate the parameters of this model.
Empirical results are reported and discussed in the next section.The
paper closes with a suiary and concluding remarks.
I. A Model of Quantity and Cost Revisions
How do defense decision—makers determine the quantities of various
we&pon systems that the government will buy?One might hypothesize that
decision-makers choose those quantities that maximize the amount of an
intangible ultimate good called "national security,'t subject to a budget
constraint.There is a technology for producing national security, a
"national security production function."The arguments of this function
are the quantities of N different weapon systems (X1, X2,. ..,XN),and the
quantity of (rvector of) other inputs Y (such as the number of troops
deployed).DOD does not face a perfectly elastic supply of any given
weapon system at an exogenously—detertnined price.Rather, there is a
cost function for each system, which indicates the (expected total) cost
of producing various quantities of the system.DOD maximizes the5
national security production function subject to the cost functions
(which may be nonseparable) and to an overall resource constraint.4
Although we believe that specifying a national security production
function might be a useful approach to analyzing procurement behavior, we
will adopt the simpler approach of directly specifying demand functions,
rather than deriving them from a production function.The particular
demand functions we specify implicitly impose (quite strong) restrictions
on the form of the production function (e.g., the elasticity of substitu-
tion between weapon i and weapon j(i,j= 1,...,N) is the same for all i
and j).
Wepostulate that at any given time in the life-cycle of a weapons
system, the Pentagon has estimates of (the slopes and intercepts of) both
the marginal cost schedule (the supply curve) and the marginal benefit
schedule (the demand curve) of the system.In particular, the Pentagon
has such estimates at two times: the date at which full-scale development
begins (time 0), and at a later date (time t).(Estimates made at time 0
are referred to astbaseline estimates.")We assume that the supply and
demand schedules are log-linear.The baseline schedules may be written
£nMCÔ0-a2nQ (1)
£nMBO0-2nQ (2)
4This model obviously abstracts from purelypoliticalfactors that
may influence procurement decisions.See Lichtenberg (1989) for a
discussion of theory and evidence concerning the possible link between
procurement decisions arid campaign contributions by government
contractors.6
where MC denotes marginal cost, MB denotes marginal benefit, Qdenotes
quantity, andis the elasticity of demand.5For simplicity, we also
assume that the baseline quantity chosen by the government is the one






In order for to be an equilibrium quantity, it must be the case that
1> a: the demand curve must be more negatively sloped than the supply
curve.Because, as we see below, weapons systems typically exhibit
decreasing marginal costs, the condition is not a trivial one.Figure 1
illustrates the determination of baseline equilibrium quantity.
As time passes following the start of full—scale development,
decision makers will revise their estimates of the supply andJor demand
5The objection might be raised that the NB schedule is unlikely to
be log—linear in Q,sincethere will be a threshold number below which
the force is not viable.Below this threshold, MB will be zero (or
perhaps negative if adding a unit to an unsurvivable force increases an
opponent's incentive for preemptive attack), and it will either jump or
rise slowly before starting to fall with Q.However,it is not clear
that the sample includes observations where threshold force size effects
are important.
6By making this assumption, we are abstracting from several problems
often thought to severely affect weapons procurement, much as moral
hazard, risk aversion and asymmetric information.As Baron and Besanko
(1988, p. 342)-demonstrate, under these conditions the equality MC=MB
will not hold at the second-best optimum.Because we are analyzing
changes in equilibrium quantity, however, there are two alternative
conditions under which deviations of the difference A E (ln MC -lnMB)
from zero will not affect the consistency of our estimates.First, if A
is unchanging over the life of a weapons system, then A will cancel out
when we analyze revisions in Qoverthe life cycle.Second, even if A
does vary over the life cycle, our estimates of aandwill be consis-
tent provided that changes inare uncorrelated across weapons systems
with changes in the intercept of the MC schedule.7
schedules.Information generated during the course of development about
the cost or difficulty of acquiring the system would result in supply-
curve revisions.7Changes in the actual or perceived nature of the
"threat" from enemy forces, and revisions in supply-curve estimates of
other (complementary or substitute) systems under development would
result in demand-curve revisions.We represent the Pentagon's estimates
of the supply and demand curves at time t (t > 0) as follows:
2nflCô-a2nQ (4)
2nNB=O_'2nQ (5)
Weassume that only the intercepts, and not the slopes, of the supply and
demand curves are subject to revision; data limitations would not allow





71n addition to changing their estimates of marginal (variable)
costs, decisions makers may change their estimate of fixed costs.Eq.





where Kis fixed cost.Changes in TC may be due to changes in K as well
as tocRanges in 0.Only changes in 0 should affect equilibrium quanti-
ty.In our empirical analysis, we use changes in ln TC as our indicator
(or measure) of changes in 0.Since TC is also affected by changes in K,
our indicator is a "noisy" one, i.e. it is subject to error.If revi-
sions of K are uncorrelated with revisions of 0, then we have classical
measurement error and our estimate of the demand elasticity will be
biased towards zero.If K and 0 revisions are positively correlated (as
one might expect), a downward bias also occurs, but it is smaller in
magnitude.See Lichtenberg (1988b).The revision in equilibrium quantity between time 0 and time t can be




The log-change in quantity is due to both Cupply- and demand-curve
revisions, each divided by the difference between the slopes of the two
curves.8Equation (7), along with the baseline supply curve (1), can
under certain assumptions provide a basis for estimating the parameters a
and .We have data, for 84 major weapons systems, on the quantity- and
supply-shift variables £n(Q/Qo)and(o-ôo).Unfortunately,we do not
have data on the demand shift
-
But suppose, as seems
reasonable, that demand shifts are uncorrelated with supply shifts across
weapons systems.Moreover, assume that a anddo not vary across
weapons systems.Then the regression equation:
(2n(Q/Qo)).=-('-aY'(ô-ô).
÷ (8)
where the i subscript denotes weapon system i and c is a disturbance
term, will yield a consistent estimate of the nonlinear function of the
8Supply- and demand-curve revisions may result in changes in the
performance, or quality, as well as in the quantity, of the system.We
will discuss below our admittedly imperfect attempt to adjust the data
for such quality change.
9We have, however, what may be crude proxies or instruments for
demand shifts -- "year effects"; this issue is discussed below.9
—1 —1 10
parameters -(-ci) . Ofcourse, neither ci nor can be separately
identified from this equation alone, but the available data permit us to
estimate another equation which identifies a.By simultaneously estimat-
ing the system of two equations, we can identify both parameters.
II.Selected Acquisition Reports Summary Data
The Department of Defense is required by law to submit periodically
to Congress Selected Acquisition Reports (SARs) for all major weapons
systems it is acquiring.All programs that are estimated to require an
eventual expenditure for research, development, test, and evaluation of
more than $200 million (in fiscal year 1980 dollars), or an eventual
expenditure for procurement of more than $1 billion, are covered by this
requirement.Routine acquisitions (such as trucks and common ammunition)
11
andhighly sensitive classifiedprograms are excluded.
The SAR provides a summary of key cost, schedule and technical
information about the program.Current estimates of cost, schedule, and
technical data are compared with established and approved baseline
estimates, and a'disciplined approach to the calculation of variances
[between baseline and current estimates] isapplied."12Most of the
schedule and technical data are classified, and therefore cannot serve as
a basis for economic research.But the cost and (in most cases) the
'0Even if-this function varies across systems, provided that it
varies randomly --i.e.,is not correlated with supply or demand shocks
-—theequation will yield consistent estimates of its mean.
11According to the Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, the share
of DOD's budget authority for procurement, R&D, and construction that is
classified increased from 13.3 percent in fiscal year 1986 to 18.5
percent in fiscal year 1988.
12Department of Defense (1986), p.3.quantity data are not classified, and in fact the Assistant Secretary of
Defense (Comptroller) regularly publishes a Program Acquisition Cost
Summary, which contains such data for all major weapons systems covered
by the reporting requirement.13
The empirical analysis performed in this paper is based on data
reported in the SAR Summary Tables as of December 31, 1987) Among the
data items recorded for each weapons system are the following: weapons
system name, baseline estimates of quantity (Q0)andcost (C0), base year
(year in which the baseline estimate was made), and current estimates of
quantity and cost (C).'5Thus, we can infer the (absolute or
logarithmic) changes in estimates of both quantity and cost between the
base year and the end of 1987 for each system.These data alone would
not be sufficient to identify the demand and supply curve parameters.
But in addition to reporting the total cost change to date, the SAR
provides a distribution of the cost change by category (or "reason' for
3Unfortunately, the published Summary doesn't provide data on
program attributes such as whether the program is strategic or tactical
(strategic programs tend to be given higher budgetary priority) and
whether the program is incremental in nature (a follow-on or modifica-
tion) or represents an entirely new endeavor.
14 . Clearly,this methodology is potentially subject to the problem of
censoring of the data.Previously initiated programs that had either
been ("successfully") completed or ("unsuccessfullytt) terminated are
absent from our data set.(Relatively few programs are cancelled,
however.)This means that the programs we observe are a nonrandom (in a
relevant sense) sample of the population of all weapons programs.To
address the censoring issue, we would need to collect data on completed
and terminated programs as well as programs in progress.This is beyond
the scope of this paper.
'5Both baseline and current estimates of costs are given in both
base—year (constant) dollars and in current-year dollars.Revisions in
current-year dollar estimates reflect changes in inflation assumptions
and projections as well as changes in real program costs.In this paper,
we analyze only the estimates expressed in base—year dollars.11
the cost change).The six categories and brief descriptions of them are
as follows:
Quantity change.A change in the nuxnber of units of an end item of
equipment.This does not include changes in support items.
Schedule change.A change in a procurement or delivery schedule,
completion date, or intermediate milestone for development or
production.
Engineering change.An alteration in the physical or functional
characteristics of a system or item, after establishment of such
characteristics.
Estimating change.A change in program cost due to correction of an
error in preparing the baseline cost estimate, refinement of a prior
current estimate, or a change in program or cost estimating assup-
tions and techniques.
Support change.Cost changes associated with training and training
equipment, peculiar support equipment, data, operational site
activation, and initial spares and repair parts.
Other.A change in program cost due to natural disasters, work
stoppage, and similarly unforeseeable events not covered in other
variance categories.
For the moment, we will group the last five categories together, and
think of revisions in estimates of total costs as occurring for two
distinct reasons: (1) quantity changes, and (2) all other reasons.We
will argue that under the accounting framework used for preparation of
the SARs, these two categories correspond to movements along the (base-
line) supply curve and shifts of the supply curve, respectively.
Figure 2 illustrates how DOD accountants allocate the change in
total cost into these two categories.NC0 and NC represent the baseline
and current marginal cost schedules, respectively, and Q0and the
baseline and current quantities.The area under the NC0 curve to the
left of Q0correspondsto the baseline estimate of total cost, C.The
area under the NC curve to the left of corresponds to the revisedestimate of total cost, C.The difference C1 -C0may be represented as
the sumoftwo components, which we denote by CQ and iCN.iCQ is the
change in cost that would have occurred if on:Ly the quantity had changed,
and the MC curve had not shifted. is the cost change that would have
occurred if only the MC curve had shifted, and the baseline quantity had
been iCQ corresponds to the first of the six categories into which
total cost change is allocated, CN to the sumofthe other five.
It is perhaps apparent that information about C0, CQ and
enables us to determine both the slope and the shift of the supply
function.In fact, our assumptions of log-linear supply curves with
constant slopes and (possibly) shifting intercepts imply the following
relationships between supply curve parameters and the observable
variables
16











16Seethe Appendix for derivation of eqs.(9) and (10).It is, of
course, possible to solve eq.(9) explicitly for a; we write the equation
in this form because we will interpret it as a regression equation for
estimating a.13
Equations (9) and (11) consitute a system of recursive nonlinear simulta-
neous equations, which provides a basis for estimating both the demand
and supply elasticities.
The intercept &ofeq.(ii) may be interpreted as the mean value of
the demand shock.Notice that eq.(9) has a zero intercept.This
reflects the fact (which applies to our data) thata weapon system with
zero quantity change has zero quantity-related cost change.This equa-
tion, however, was based on the assumption of a log-linear MC curve. If
the true MC curve is not log-linear, then a log—linear curve fitted to it
may have a nonzero intercept, even if the true curve passes through the
origin.We therefore estimate variants of eq.(9) both excluding and
including an intercept.
Although above we tentatively defined aCQ simply as "quantity-
related cost change" (the first category) and ACN as "all other cost
changes" (the remaining five categories), we need to make two amendments
to the latter definition.We will treat both engineering-related and
support-related cost changes as neither shifts in nor movements along the
supply curve.As defined above, engineering-related cost changes are due
to efforts to alter the physical characteristics, or "quality,t' of the
system.(In practice, most such expenditures are incurred to modify
"mature" weapons in order to extend their useful lives, and avoid the
acquisition of entirely new systems.)Our analysis thus far has been
based on the implicit assumption that we were examining the relationship
between cost changes and quantity changes of systems of unchanging
quality.In the literature on ("hedonic") price measurement and quality
change, an accepted technique of "adjusting" for quality change in price
indices is to subtract the producer's cost of increasing the product'squality; this technique is used by the Bureau of Labor Statistics, the
government agency that produces the official price indices.17Thus,
eliminating engineering-related cost changes from consideration appears
to be appropriate if we want to examine the relationship between
"quality-adjusted" changes in cost and quantity.
Support-related cost changes are excluded from both CQ and
because these represent changes in the cost of complementary goods rather
than changes in the cost of the weapon system itselfj8It may be useful
to interpret support-related cost changes within the context of a simple
two-equation system of demand equations.Let the subscripts1 and 2
denote end-items and support items, respectively, and P, Q,andC denote
price, quantity, and cost.Suppose that the supplies of both products
are perfectly elastic at exogenously-deterinined prices, and that the
demand equations are log—linear:
ln Qi =Bijln P1 +°12ln P2
(12)
in Q2 =821in P1 + °22 in P2
Hence
ln C1 =(eu+1) ln P1 + °12 ln P2
(13)
ln C2 =°21in P1 + (22 + 1) ln P2
Since the two goods are assumed to be complements, the cross— as well as
own—demand elasticies are assumed to be negative.Changes in C1 and C2
175ee Early and Sinclair (1983) and Lichtenberg and Griliches (1988)
for discussions of the issue of quality change in the context of output
and price measurement.
18We initially conjectured that support-related cost changes should
be included in our definition of AC ,onthe grounds that the baseline
cost estimate C0 includes the costf support items (e.g., spare parts)15
are seen to be jointly endogenous; it would be incorrect to regard
support-related cost changes as causing changes in C1.Although we can
observe changes in P1 (i.e., the supply shift -oo), C1,and C2,
unfortunately we cannot observe changes in P2, so we can't identify the
e.otherthan e11.
1]
Tosummarize, CN will be defined as the sum of schedule, estimat-
ing, and other changes.We will also estimate models in which ACN 1
disaggregatedinto its components.
III. Empirical Results
This section begins by presenting descriptive statistics on quantity
and cost revisions for 84 major weaponssystems.'9We then report and
analyze estimates of the model developed in the previous section.To
facilitate discussion, we adopt the following notation:
DQ =log(Q/Q0) (log change in system quantity)
DC.Q =log(1+ (logchange in cost due to quantity change)
DC.NONQ =log(1
+C+C
(log change in cost not due to
0 Q quantitychange)
as well as the-cost of the ("end-item") weapons themselves.But this
definition led to nonsensical estimates of .
'9TheSAR Summary Tables contained data for exactly 100 systems.
Thirteen systems had classified data on program quantities and therefore
had to be excluded from the sample.The value of the ratio Q/Qowas
zero for 2 systems (the Navy }tFAJ and the Air Force I—S/AAMPk) and
extremely small (3/645) for the Air Force small ICBH.The former two















) (logthange in cost due to other
o Q change)
LAGE =log(1988.1—BaseYear) (loz of'age" of baseline estimate)
Because ACNACScHED+ACESTIM + ACoR, and because all four of
these variables are small, on average, relative to (C0 + ACQ) DC.NONQ is
approximately equal to the sum of DC.SCHED, DC.ESTIM AND DC.OTHER (since





= + it DC.NONQ. + u. (15)
where t -(-aY1and u. (c.-
Table1 presents descriptive statistics and a correlation matrix for
these variables.The mean change in log quantity is.23, indicating a 26
percent average increase in the number of units.The huge defense
buildup of the-early 1980s is no doubt largely responsible for this
increase.Mean cost change attributable to quantity change (DC.Q) is
lower than quantity change (DQ) itself --.18compared to .23 --evident-
ly reflecting decreasing marginal cost.Mean cost change not due to
quantity change (DC.NONQ) is quite small (.03) and not significantly17
different from zero.Perhaps this is because firms are forced to "eat"
most of the costs of schedule, estimating, and other changes.
There are two alternative approaches one can take to estimating the
parametersand , andwe will pursue both of them.One can estimate a
separate value of ,.,foreach weapons system using the equation
(based on (14))
=1-(DC.Q/DQ.) (16)
Obviously,. canbe calculated only if DQ. 0, which is true in the
case of 64 Out of 84observations.20Statistics relating to the










The mean and median values of .appearto be quite consistent with
previous estimates of the elasticity of cost with respect to quantity
contained in the empirical learning-curve literature on the defense
industry.One can then replace the constant c by the variable c. in
eq.(15) and estimateby nonlinear OLS (NOLS)estimationof that
20Due to thepresence of and u. in eq.(15), one cannot estimate
separate values of ,., fromthat e4uation (conditional on ct) in an
analogous fashion.Attmpts to do so yield absurd values of te .;for
example, their mean is —.74, and their standard deviation is 10.5.equation alone.The alternative approach is to assume (as we did above)
that both a and are invariant across observations, and to interpret
eq.(14) as a regression equation for estimating a.Disturbances in this
equation arise due to both non-log-linearity of the MC schedule and to
deviations of a. from the assumed common a.Estimates of a and are
obtained via simultaneous estimation of eqs.(14) and (15).The distur-
bances of the two equations may be correlated, so we may increase the
efficiency of the estimates by using nonlinear seemingly unrelated
regressions (NSUR),orjoint generalized least squares, estimation.
Because eq.(14) has a zero intercept, the OLS formula for the
slope of this equation is
Z(DC.Q.)(DQ.)













using(16) and the definition w.BQ/ZDQ (hence Zw. =1).&isa
weighted average of the individual a.ts, with weights proportional to
the square of the log-change in quantity.The sign of the difference
between &andEE
-4—Za. .222 (the unweighted average of the a's)
depends on the sign of the correlation between a. and w.: sgn(& - =
sgn(corr(a.,w.)).The sample value of the correlation coefficient is19
positive (.176) although not very significant (prob.-value =.16),so &
willexceed the simple average of thecr's.21
Table 2 present estimates of the demand elasticity for the version
of the model with individual a'sand estimates of both demand and cost
1
elasticitiesfor the version with common a.The first line shows nonlin-
ear OLS estimates of eq.(15) in which the parameter a is replaced by the
computed aj's as defined in eq.(16).The estimate of is positive (as
hypothesized) but far from being significantly different from zero.The
interceptis positive and highly significant.The insignificance of
implies that we cannot reject the hypothesis that quantity demanded does
not respond to supply shocks.The correlation matrix in Table 1 reveals,
however, that both DQ and DC.NONQ are positively correlated with the age
of the baseline estimate (a proxy for the age of the program itself):
older programs tend to have experienced both higher quantity growth
(perhaps due to larger demand increases) and greater supply shifts.
These correlations might tend to bias downward the estimated demand
elasticity.
We can, perhaps, eliminate or at least reduce this bias by control-
ling for system age in the DQ equation,The most general way of doing
this is to include (program base) "year effects" as regressors in that
equation.When we allow for these effects, we are analyzing the within—
xirelationshipbetween DQ and DC.NONQ, i.e., we are asking whether
programs that experienced larger supply shifts had lower quantity
increases than other programs with the same base year.This seems a more
2lview of eq. (16), this positive correlation may be at least
partly spurious, induced by errors of measurement of DQ, due for example
to "phony" estimates of baseline quantity Qo.Such errors would also
bias upward the estimate &fromeq.(15).20
appropriate reference group than the entire set of programs, which vary
considerably in age.To the extent that there are changes over time in
overall defense demand (e.g., the 1979-84 defense buildup) that affect
all programs then in existence, these year effects may be considered as
capturing demand shocks common to systems of given age.
Line (2) of the table displays the estimates when year effects are
included in the DQ equation.As expected, the estimate of the demand
elasticity increases, to about .54.Its t—ratio is now 1.66, so the
elasticity is significantly greater than zero at about the 5 percent
level, using a one-tailed test.
The estimates in line (3) and in subsequent lines are from the
common—a version of the model, and are therefore based on a larger sample
(observations for which DQ =0are included).The estimates of and
in line (3), which correspond to the model without year effects, are
similar to, but slightly smaller than, their counterparts in line (1).
The estimate of aislarger than the simple average of the a., consistent
with our earlier discussion of the relationship between &and.The
estimated intercept of the DC.Q equation (a0) is small but statistically
22
significant.
In line (4) we replace the intercept of the DQ equation by a
complete set of year dummies.This has virtually no effect on the
estimates of a and a0 but almost triples the point estimate of ,to
.557.This icvirtually identical to the point estimate of in line 2
(although the standard error is 30 percent lower), which suggests that
22The correlation between the disturbances of the DQ and DC.Qeqs.
is close to zero (—.01), so the NOLS and NSUR estimates of this model are
virtually identical.21
theestimate of is not sensitive to what assumption we make about the
heterogeneity of
23
In line (5) of the table we include year effects in the DC.Q
equation as well as in the DQ equation.Their inclusion has essentially
no effect on the estimates of and a.
The estimated standard errors reported in Table 2 are correct if and
only if the disturbances of the equation(s) are homoskedastic.We tested
the null hypothesis of homoskedasticity using the test of first and
second moment specification proposed by White (1980), and rejected the
null hypothesis in the case of bothequations.24Because eq.(14) is
linear in the parameter a, it is straightforward to compute the
heteroskedasticity-consistent standard error of a: it is .064, about 75
percent larger than the uncorrected standard error of .037 on line (5).
Because eq.(15) is nonlinear in ,itis unfortunately not straightfor-
ward to compute the heteroskedasticity—consistent standard error of .
Howeverwe can, perhaps, get an idea of the magnitude of the appropriate
correction by computing both the uncorrected and heteroskedasticity-
consistentstandard errorsof the "reduced—form" parameter
23Pojtestimates of the year dummies corresponding to line (4) are
as follows for 1970—87, respectively: .63, .54,.96, .75,NE (notesti-
mated --noobservations with program base year 1974),.35,.22,.81,
.48 ,,12,.03,.22,.09,. 70, -.02, .42, .03, -.01.The standard errors
on the individual year dummies are large, so that most are notsignifi-
cant, but the coefficients reveal a clear pattern.The average value of
the 1970-78 (pre-defense buildup) year dummies is .59, and that of the
1979—87 dummies is .18.Programs initiated before the defense buildup
experienced much larger (positive) demand shocks than those started
during or after the buildup.
24Thisis somewhat surprising since the logarithmic transformation,
which usually attenuates heteroskedasticity, is applied to all ofthe
variables.22
it
= - theseare .395 and .469, respectively.Since the value
of itispredominantly determined by ,thismay indicate that the stan-
dard errors ofreported in Table 2 are underestimated by no more than
16 percent.
For each equation, we also tested the hypothesis of normality of the
residuals using the Kolomogorov D statistic.Despite the fact that plots
of both distributions appeared similar to normal curves, the hypothesis
was rejected at the .01 level in both cases.Given the moderate size of
our sample, however, rejection of normality is unlikely to seriously
undermine the validity of our inference procedures.
Because the total shift in the supply curve DC.NONQ is (approximate-
ly) the sum of shifts occurring for three different types of reasons --
schedulechanges, estimating changes, and other changes -—itseems
natural to inquire whether the response of quantity demanded to supply
shifts depends on the nature of or reason for the shift.We investigate
this issue by removing DC.NONQ from the DQ equation and, instead, includ-
ing as regressors its three components, DC.SCHED, DC.ESTIN, and DC.OTIIER.
We allow the coefficient associated with each of the three components
to differ.Estimates (standard errors) of thecoefficients associated





25Estimates of the coefficient on DC.OTHER would not converge after
numerous attempts with different starting values.This may be due to the
relatively low variability of DC.OTHER: the number of observations with23
It is obvious that our finding above of a negative correlation between
DC.NONQ and DQ (hence a nonzero demand elasticity) was due primarily to
the negative correlation between DCSCHED andDQ.26The response to cost
revisions due to schedule changes is large --indeed,greater than one
--andhighly significant.These estimates suggest that procurement
officials adjust program quantities mainly in response to cost revisions
that are associated with schedule changes.
This interpretation, if it is correct, appears in certain respects
consistent with the observations made by Peck, Scherer, and othersabout
tradeoffs between cost, time, and performance in weapon system acquisi-
tion.Improving the performance, or quality, of a system entails in-
creases in development cost and/or time.Reducing development time
requires increases in cost and/or sacrifices in quality, and reducing
cost means either slower development or lower quality.Data presented by
Peck and Scherer suggest that decision makers attach the greatestimpor-
tance to achieving performance objectives, the least importance to
achieving cost objectives, and intermediate importance to achieving
development time objectives.For a sample of 12 weapon systems, they
found that whereas "actual performance more frequentlyexceeded original
promises than fell below them" (p. 23), actual developmenttime was on
average 1.36 times as large as the original timeestimate, and actual
cost was 3.2 times the original cost estimate.This suggests that
nonzero values of DC.SC}IED, DC.ESTIM, andDC.OTJ1ER were 51,82, and15,
respectively.See also their standard deviations reported in Table 1.
260ur previous estimate ofof about .55 is close to a
variance-weighted average of thecoefficients associated with DC.SCHED
and DC.ESTIN.24
decision makers have lower tolerance for time slippage than for cost
growth, and are willing to incur substantial additional cost to keepa
program close to schedule.A program that experiences significant
schedule delays despite the infusion of additional funds might be inter-
preted as one encountering unusually serious technical difficulties, and
therefore one liable to the greatest quantity reduction (or the smallest
quantity increase).
Our key empirical finding is that there is an inverse relationship
between program quantity changes and (non-quantity-related) changes in
program costs, particularly those due to schedule changes.We have
interpreted these program cost changes as reflecting exogenous "supply
shocks" that occur in the course of weapons acquisition, an activity
characterized by considerable technical uncertainty.As Peck and Scherer
note, this is "the most common explanation offered for time, cost and
quality variances" (p. 435), and it is consistent with data analyzed by
Marshall and Heckling, who found that "average production cost and
development time variances were an increasing function of the size of the
technological advance sought't (p. 435).But Peck and Scherer argue that
'ttecbiiological uncertainty is one likely cause of development cost
overruns, but by no means the only cause" (p. 436).They maintain that
the most significant cause of schedule delays is the "lack of urgency in
connection with lower priority programs" (p. 459).
In this vein, one could argue that the negative correlation across
programs between quantity changes and schedule—related cost changes is
due to the response of both variables to unobserved demand shocks, rather
than the response of the first to the second.In this case, of course,
our estimate of could no longer be interpreted as a demand elasticity.25
Suppose that changes in the (actual or perceived) nature of "the threat"
change the relative demand for different programs: some programs seem
more, others less, attractive than they did under previous evaluations of
the military environment.In the case of programs that have become less
attractive, decision makers might be hypothesized to do two things:
reduce program quantities and "stretch out" the development and acquisi-
tion of the remaining quantities.Such "stretch—outs" will generally
result in schedule-related cost increases, so that these demand shocks
could contribute to the observed negative correlation.
We have both a theoretical and an econometric response to the
objection thatmay not be identified due to our inability to measure
demand shocks.First, Defense Department officials claim that decisions
to stretch out programs are generally not related to decisions to change
the ultimate size of the program.(In fact, stretching out a program may
be the only or easiest way of preserving the original size of the pro-
gram.)Also, because both positive and negative deviations from the
original schedule of program milestones will generally result in
schedule—related cost increases, programs that have experienced demand
increases would (under the assumptions of the previous paragraph) exhibit
both quantity increases and schedule-related cost increases.This would
induce a positive correlation between DQ and DC.SCIIED, and tend to offset
the effect of programs whose demand has declined.
We can attempt to address the potential problem of endogeneity of
DC.SCIIED by estimating the DQ equation via instrumental variables.The
difficulty, of course, is finding appropriate instruments for DC.SCIIED,
and our choices are severely limited.Because DC.ESTIN was not signifi-
cant in the DQ equation, and also because based on their definitionit26
seems to be a relatively "pure" supply shock (less likely than DC.SCHIED
to be contaminated by demand shocks) we dropped it fromthe DQ equation
and instead used it as an instrument for DC.SCHED.We also used DC.OTI-IER
as an instrument.The ("first-stage") linear regression of DC.SCJEDon
these two instruments is as follows (standarderrors in parentheses):
DC.SCHED =.024+.176DC.ESTIM +.l67 DC.OTHER +error
(.008)(.039) (.488)
Whenwe estimate equation (15),replacingDC.NONQby thepredicted value
of DC.SCIED from the first—stage regression above,the estimate (standard
error) ofis 1.317 (0.422), about the same as (indeed, slightlylarger
than) the non-instrumental estimate.The standard error approximately
doubles, but the parameter remains highly significantlydifferent from
zero.The similarity of the two estimates suggests that(conditional on
this set of instruments) we do not commita specification error in using
NSUR, and therefore that the NSUR estimates shouldbe viewed as
consistent.
IV.Summaryand Conclusions
We have attempted in this paper to make inferencesabout the elas-
ticity of the government's demand for specificweapons by analyzing the
statistical relationship between quantity andcost revisions across the
population of major weapon systems.We interpret the cost revisions as
due in part t& the arrival of technological informationgenerated in the
course of research and development.If the government's demand is less
than perfectly inelastic, it will react to this informationby changing
the quantity of the weapon it will buy.The more elastic the demand, the27
less market power is wielded by sole-source suppliers of particular
systems.
When we standardize the data by program base year --ineffect
comparing a program only to those other programs entering full-scale
development at about the same time --wefind a significant negative
correlation between quantity and cost changes.The estimated elasticity
of demand is .55, and is significantly different from both zero and
unity.This suggests that the government's demand for specific weapons
is inelastic, but not perfectly inelastic.The estimates also imply that
weapons acquisition is characterized by increasing returns: the mean and
median values of the elasticity of total cost with respect to quantity
are .78 and .72, respectively.
Further analysis revealed that the negative correlationbetween
quantity and cost revisions -—hencethe nonzero demand elasticity --was
entirely attributable to one component of cost revisions: those associat-
ed with changes in the acquisition schedule.The elasticity of quantity
with respect to schedule-related cost increases is about twice as great
as the elasticity with respect to cost increases generally.In princi-
ple, it is possible that schedule-related cost increases are due to
demand-induced stretch-outs of programs rather than supply-related, or
technological, shocks.But it.isnot clear on theoretical grounds that
unobserved demand shocks could account for the correlations we observe,
and the demand—shock interpretation is also not supported by one econo-
metric attempt to correct for it.$
Figure 1
Determination of Baseline Equilibrium Quantity and Cost
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Variable Mean Std. Dev. Median Mm. t1ax.
DQ .229 .664 .063 -2.52 2.55
DC.Q .175 .412 .0T9 -1.17 1.64
DC.NONQ .052 .237 -.004 -0.28 0.95
DC.SCHED .029 .080 .000 -0.14 0.45
DC.ESTIM .027 .208 -.009 -0.43 0.74
DC.OTHER .003 .017 .000 -0.09 0.08





DC.NONQ -.07 -.17 1.00
DC.SCHED -.20 -.26 .66 1.00
DC.ESTIM -.06 -.14 .97 .47 1.00
DC.OTHER .26 .15 .28 .13 .22 1.00













































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Derivation of Equations (9) and (10)
nMCô0-a2nQ
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